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THE NEW JOINT CUSTODY STATUTE:
CHRYSALIS OF CONFLICT OR CONCILIATION?
I. INTRODUCTION
The current interest in joint custody is the result of
changes in parental roles and lifestyles in recent years.1 The
growing number of dissolution proceedings and the changing
concepts of sex roles have engendered increasing criticism of
the judicial handling of child custody disputes.' It is esti-
mated that ninety percent of all custody awards are decided
in favor of the mother.3 Criticism has been directed at the re-
sults of child custody disputes as. well as the means by which
the results are reached.4 As new concepts of femininity and
masculinity evolve, the traditional expectations of parenting
are changing.
Recent research emphasizes the importance of the fa-
ther's role in childrearing.5 Social attitudes and laws have
changed to make it easier for fathers to request custody of
their children. Although numerous explanations have been of-
fered for the increasing involvement of men in parenting, the
major factors appear to be an increasing sensitivity to the im-
portance of the male role in the childrearing process, and an
awareness that fathers have a realistic possibility of prevailing
in a custody proceeding. 6
In addition, an increasing number of mothers now recog-
nize that fathers are competent to take care of children after
© 1981 by Sandra Blair Kloster
1. See Grote & Weinstein, Joint Custody: A Viable and Ideal Alternative, 1 J.
DIVORCE 43 (1977).
2. Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAM.
L. 423, 423 (1977).
3. Id.
4. Id. See Kurtz, The State Equal Rights Amendments and Their Impact on
Domestic Relations Law, 11 FAN. L.Q. 101, 103 (1977) ("Of all areas of the law, this
field is one which has been the most sexist in its traditional mandates. The laws of
alimony, divorce and child custody ... have been based on gender-based
classifications.").
5. See, e.g., Grief, Fathers, Children, and Joint Custody, 49 AM. J. ORTHO-
PSYCH. 311 (1979); Quinn, Fathers Cry for Custody, JURIs DOCTOR, May 1976, at 42.
6. Gaddis, Joint Custody of Children: A Divorce Decision-Making Alternative,
16 CONCILIATION COURTS REV. 17 (1978).
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the dissolution of the marriage. Partly because of the equal
rights movement and the subsequent increase in the number
of women working outside the home,8 the sharing of child care
responsibilities is more prevalent.9
As a result of the quest for sexual equality, legal pre-
sumptions and preferences are being replaced by legislation
that more equitably applies to both parents in child custody
disputes.10 Recent legislative efforts in California have re-
sulted in the passage of new joint custody legislation, effective
January 1980. With the passage of its new bill, the California
Legislature has sanctioned joint custody as an important al-
ternative for restructuring families after dissolution.
This comment considers the evolution of child custody
law to the present with a major focus on California's joint cus-
tody legislation and the problem areas likely to be encoun-
tered as a result of the new law. The comment considers some
of the deficiencies in the legislation and examines the feasibil-
ity of joint custody arrangements.
II. REVIEW OF CALIFORNIA LAW
At early common law, child custody matters reflected the
concepts of the feudal system.1 Custody disputes were de-
cided on the basis of the father's property rights in the child.1'
As late as 1900, common law was cited as authority for the
legal concept of the child as property." In the nineteenth cen-
tury, statutes were enacted that began to limit the father's ab-
solute right to the children.1 4 With the advent of the indus-
7. Id. at 17.
8. Bratt, Joint Custody, 67 Ky. L.J. 271, 277 (1979).
9. See M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT 90 (1978).
10. Brosky & Alford, Sharpening Solomon's Sword: Current Considerations in
Child Custody Cases, 81 DICK. L. REv. 683, 683-84 (1977).
11. See, e.g., M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 9, at 27-33; Bratt, supra note
8, at 280; Foster & Freed, Joint Custody: A Viable Alternative?, TRIAL, May 1979, at
27 [hereinafter cited as Foster]; Roth, supra note 2, at 425-28.
12. See, e.g., Bratt, supra note 8, at 280; Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of
Children Following Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. REv. 523, 530 (1979); Gaddis, supra note 6,
at 17; Roth, supra note 2, at 425.
13. See Campbell v. Wright, 130 Cal. 380, 382, 62 P. 613, 614 (1900) ("The fa-
ther's right, at least so far as the services of the child are concerned, is strictly a
property right .... The right must therefore be regarded as coming within the rea-
son, if not within the strict letter, of the constitutional provisions for the protection
of property.")
14. See, e.g., Bratt, supra note 8, at 281; Foster, supra note 11, at 27; Foster &
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trial revolution1" and the resulting demarcation between
fathers' work at the factory and mothers' work in the home,
courts began to favor the mother as the preferred custodian. 16
The California courts have traditionally favored the
mother in child custody determinations. Sole custody of the
children is generally awarded to the mother with visitation
rights granted to the noncustodial father. The visitation
rights are usually referred to as "reasonable" and dissolution
agreements often specify particular days, weekends, and holi-
days that the noncustodial parent is to have the companion-
ship of the children. s
A. The Tender Years Doctrine
Before amendment in 1972, California's statutory law re-
quired that the best interests of the child be considered:
As between parents adversely claiming the custody,
neither parent is entitled to it as of right; but other things
being equal, if the child is of tender years, custody should
be given to the mother: if the child is of an age to require
education and preparation for labor or business, then cus-
tody should be given to the father.1"
Under this statutory scheme, the custody of a child of tender
years was given to the mother unless she was shown to be un-
fit.'0 This doctrine operates to favor women solely because
Freed, Life with Father, 11 FAM. L.Q. 321, 327 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Freed);
Roth, supra note 2, at 429.
15. Bratt, supra note 8, at 280-81.
16. Id. at 281. For a general history of custody, see Freed, supra note 14. See
also Derdeyn, Child Custody Contests in Historical Perspective, 12 AM. J. PSYCH.
133 (1978).
17. See Note, The California Custody Decree, 13 STAN. L. REv. 108, 111 (1960).
18. Id. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 4601 (West 1970) ("Reasonable visitation rights
shall be awarded to a parent unless it is shown that such visitation would be detri-
mental to the best interests of the child.").
19. CAL. CIV. CODE § 138(2) (West 1954) (repealed 1970). An extensive collec-
tion of cases containing a tender years presumption is cited in Roth, supra note 2, at
432-33.
20. For a discussion of parental unfitness see, e.g., Bronson, Custody on Ap-
peal, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 737, 740-41 (1944). See also, Note, The California
Custody Decree, supra note 17, at 117 ("The most common situation warranting a
change in custody arises when the custodian is found unfit. There is no statutory
definition of unfitness, but an important limitation on judicial discretion is found in
the rule that the conduct complained of must have a direct bearing on the child's
welfare."). For a case discussing which years are "tender" see Russell v. Russell, 20
Cal. App. 457, 129 P. 467 (1913). See also, Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d. 262, 287-93, 301-03
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they are women and assumes mothers are by nature better
suited to caring for the needs of the children. An idealized
stereotype of a loving, affectionate, nurturing mother, rather
than any statutory criteria, often served as the basis for the
custody award.2
The appellate courts were reluctant to deprive the mother
of custody because it was a "well known fact that there is no
substitute for a mother's love." 2 The maternal preference was
consistently recognized notwithstanding the fact that the best
interests test was to be utilized. 3
When facts are established which clearly make applicable
the quoted provision of this section [former Civil Code
§ 138] that custody should be awarded to the mother, it
is not within the discretion of the court to ignore it. There
is no more sound or universally recognized rule of law to
be found in the books. When the court finds that 'other
things' are equal, young children are invariably given into
the custody of their mother.2'
The maternal preference was criticized as violative of fathers'
rights.' The presumption in favor of the mother imposed a
difficult burden of proof upon the father.'
The father's claim to custody under former Civil Code
Section 138, that other things being equal, the father should
have custody when "the child is of an age to require education
and preparation for labor or business, 27 was ignored by the
courts. 8 Even where the statute explicitly directed equal
treatment of the parents, courts avoided the evaluation of the
best interests of the child or the relative merits of the par-
(1976).
21. Kurtz, supra note 4, at 138.
22. Washburn v. Washburn, 49 Cal. App. 2d 581, 588, 122 P.2d 96, 100 (1942).
23. Roth, supra note 2, at 435.
24. Bemis v. Bemis, 89 Cal. App. 2d 80, 90, 200 P.2d 84, 90 (1948).
25. Kurtz, supra note 4, at 139.
26. Roth, supra note 2, at 440. See also Kurtz, supra note 4, at 142 ("It is not
sufficient for a state simply to require that a mother need only be fit to gain child
custody, while the father with the same general fitness is denied custody.").
27. CAL. CIv. CODE § 138(2) (West 1954) (repealed 1970). This section imposed
a sexual stereotype that a mother was not capable of providing for a child's education
or preparing a child for entry into the job market.
28. But see Disney v. Disney, 121 Cal. App. 2d 602, 263 P.2d 865 (1953). An
adolescent boy was placed in his father's custody because the court found the mother
incapable of handling the boy's problems at his stage of development.
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ents.2 ' In Bemis v. Bemis,"0 the court stated:
[W]e have not found in our reported cases a single in-
stance in which custody of young children has been
awarded to their father upon evidence that the mother
was a fit and proper person to have their custody and was
able to give them advantages equal to those they enjoy in
the home of the father."1
B. California's Family Law Act of 1970
The California Family Law Act of 1970 brought about
much needed changes in the area of child custody.3 2 Civil
Code section 4600 of that Act established an order of prefer-
ence for courts to follow in making custody awards and gave
judges an opportunity to depart from traditional rules that
existed under former law. Custody was to be awarded:
(a) To either parent according to the best interests of
the child, but, other things being equal, custody shall be
given to the mother if the child is of tender years.
(b) To the person or. persons in whose home the child
has been living in a wholesome and stable environment.
(c) To any other person or persons deemed by the
court to be suitable and able to provide adequate and
proper care and guidance for the child. 3
The 1970 Act no longer required the court to find a par-
ent unfit before awarding custody to a nonparent. Custody
awards to a nonparent currently require either consent of the
parents or a dual finding that an award of custody to the par-
ent would be detrimental to the child and that the award to
the nonparent is in the best interests of the child.34 Although
the enactment of section 4600 departed from the former prin-
29. Kurtz, supra note 4, at 141.
30. 89 Cal. App. 2d 80, 200 P.2d 84 (1948).
31. Id. at 90, 200 P.2d at 90.
32. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4000-5138 (West 1970 & Supp. 1980). With its enactment
of the Family Law Act, the California Legislature instituted various changes within
the field of domestic relations. See, e.g., Porter & Walsh, The Evolution of Califor-
nia's Child Custody Laws: A Question of Statutory Interpretation, 7 S.W. L. REv. 1
(1975); Note, The End of Innocence: Elimination of Fault in California Divorce Law,
17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1306 (1970).
33. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600 (West 1970) (amended 1970, 1972 and 1979).
34. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600(c) (West Supp. 1980). For a discussion of an award to
a nonparent see Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the
Face of Indeterminancy, 39 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 226 (1975).
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ciple of parental unfitness and focused attention on potential
detriment to the child, the statute made it quite clear that
parental custody of minor children was preferred. The pre-
sumption that an award to a parent is in the best interests of
the child was merely made rebuttable."
C. Elimination of Sex-Bias
The tender years doctrine was conclusively eliminated
from the Civil Code in 1972. This modification allowed the
court to award custody to either parent regardless of the age
of the child. The "best interests of the child" standard facili-
tated the relinquishment of sex-biased presumptions favoring
the mother and replaced them with a neutral standard." The
amendment of Civil Code section 4600 enhanced a father's
chances of obtaining custody of minor children.
The elimination of sexual bias in the statute reflected the
quest for sexual equality by both men and women. The new
standard, however, was insufficient to satisfy the increasingly
vocal fathers' rights groups who were seeking the custodial
power fathers once had at common law.3 7 Even after the 1972
amendment of section 4600, the statute failed to provide for a
joint custody arrangement and stated that custody could be
awarded only to either parent or to a nonparent. Custody by
both parents seemed to be precluded by the statute's specifi-
cation of exclusive custody of children.
D. The Inadequacies of Prior Joint Custody Cases
In addition to a lack of express statutory basis for shared
custody, the case law did not favor joint custody orders. Judi-
cial interpretation of the legal effects of joint custody orders
made such awards virtually meaningless for the noncustodial
parent.
In Burge v. San Francisco,"8 an earlier divorce decree had
given both parents joint legal custody of the child with physi-
cal custody resting with the mother. In upholding the
mother's right to settle the minor child's claim in a personal
injury suit, the court stated that because the mother had the
35. Porter & Walsh, supra note 32, at 14.
36. Brosky & Alford, supra note 10, at 698.
37. Roth, supra note 2, at 424.
38. 41 Cal. 2d 608, 262 P.2d 6 (1953).
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physical custody of the child, she was in effect the true custo-
dian. Thus, the mother was authorized to settle the claim out
of court without the father's consultation or permission."'
This decision prevented the noncustodial parent from using
joint custody as a legal basis for participating in important
decisions regarding the care of the child.
The inadequacies of the award of joint legal custody were
exemplified in another California case, Holsinger v. Hot-
singer." In this case, the court again gave joint legal custody
to both parents; physical custody of the child was given to the
mother. The court held that where disagreement developed
with respect to the minor children, the wife's instructions and
directions were to be followed as though she had sole
custody."1
The court again limited the usefulness of joint legal cus-
tody in Adoption of Van Anda." In an earlier decree, the
court had awarded joint legal custody to both parents; physi-
cal custody was given to the mother. In a subsequent adoption
proceeding, initiated by a stepparent, the issue before the
court was whether the children could be adopted if both par-
ents did not agree. The adoption statute allowed one parent
to consent to the adoption of a child if that parent had cus-
tody.48 The court upheld the mother's right to consent to the
adoption, stating that the physical custody vested in the
mother amounted to full custody and authority. "[W]e discern
a legislative intent to use the word 'custody' to mean 'physical
custody' for the reason that in the usual custody agreement
between parents, the physical control of the child is the essen-
tial consideration."
The inadequacies of the few decisions which did award
some form of joint custody and the reluctance of the courts to
39. Id. at 618-19, 262 P.2d at 13.
40. 44 Cal. 2d 132, 279 P.2d 961 (1955).
41. Id. at 133, 279 P.2d at 961.
42. 62 Cal. App. 3d 189, 132 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1976).
43. Id. at 192, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 879 (quoting CAL. Civ. CODE § 224 (West 1954)
as amended by 1969 Cal. Stats., ch. 1611, at 3376 § 2 (amended 1974 and 1975)).
Section 224 still provides for the consent of one parent for the adoption of a child:
"[I]f one parent has been awarded custody by judicial decree, or has custody by
agreement of the parents, and the other parent for a period of one year willfully fails
to communicate with and to pay for the care, support, and education of such child
when able to do so, then the parent having custody alone may consent to such adop-
tion .. " CAL. CIv. CODE § 224 (West Supp. 1980).
44. 62 Cal. App. 3d at 194, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
1981]
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award joint custody without an explicit statutory basis,45
added to the growing momentum for a more meaningful form
of shared custody, supported by clear legislative sanction. The
emergence of women in the labor force, the increased involve-
ment of fathers in child care, and the growing interest in sex-
ual equality heightened the inadequacies of existing joint cus-
tody law and contributed to the movement for legislative
reform.
III. COMPARISON OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW JOINT CUSTODY
STATUTE WITH LEGISLATION OF OTHER STATES
In most states the authority to award joint custody rests
in the wide discretion given to the courts in custody matters.
The various state laws concerning child custody cover the
spectrum from the absence of any express provision for joint
custody to the more detailed legislation newly enacted in Cali-
fornia.46 In addition to California there are five other states
that recognize joint custody by statute. The other five states
passed their legislation before the fathers' rights groups grew
more specific in their demands. Consequently, those statutes
lack the procedural constraints required by California's new
statute. Wisconsin, Iowa and Oregon simply grant the court
the power to award joint custody, while North Carolina and
Maine imply the authorization of shared custody by describ-
ing such an arrangement in their statutes.
At the turn of the century, virtually no shared custody
awards were made.47 North Carolina was the first state whose
statutes authorized joint custody arrangements,48 if in "the
best interest of the child. '49 Iowa statutes have since provided
that a court order may authorize joint custody of the children
45. Ramey, Stender & Smaller, Joint Custody: Are Two Homes Better Than
One? 8 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 559, 561 (1979).
46. For a review of joint custody legislation see Folberg & Graham, Joint Cus-
tody of Children Following Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 523, 542-44 (1979).
47. See Note, Divided Custody of Children After Their Parents' Divorce, S J.
FAM. L. 58, 62-63 (1968).
48. Id.
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(b) (1976) provides:
An order for custody of a minor child may grant exclusive custody of
such child to one person, agency, organization or institution or if clearly
in the best interest of the child, provide for custody in two or more of
the same, at such times and for such periods as will in the opinion of the
judge best promote the interest and welfare of the child.
[Vol. 21478
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where "justified."5 Wisconsin's statute authorizing joint cus-
tody defines the concept as an arrangement whereby "both
parties have equal rights and responsibilities to the minor
child and neither party's rights are superior."5 1 The Oregon
statute does not define joint custody but authorizes the court
to award custody to "one party or jointly. . . as it may deem
just and proper."52 Maine's statute also encompasses joint
custody without expressly stating such, by declaring that the
judge may decree the parent who is to have exclusive custody
or "may apportion the exclusive care and custody of the said
minor between the parents, as the good of the child may
require." 58
California's law is much more detailed. It is also a much
stronger statute in that, in addition to authorizing joint cus-
tody, the legislation mandates a statutory presumption that
joint custody is in the best interests of the child where both
parents agree to such an award." The bill also allows the
court, at its discretion, to award joint custody to both parents
even if one parent does not agree to the arrangement.55
50. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West Supp. 1979) provides in part: "When a dis-
solution of marriage is decreed, the court may make such order in relation to the
children, property, parties, and the maintenance of the parties as shall be justified.
The order may include provision for joint custody of the children by the parties."
51. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(b) (West Supp. 1980) provides:
The court may give the care and custody of such children to the parties
jointly if the parties so agree and if the court finds that a joint custody
arrangement would be in the best interest of the child or children. Joint
custody under this paragraph means that both parties have equal rights
and responsibilities to the minor child and neither party's rights are
superior.
52. OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105 (1979) provides in part:
(1) Whenever the court grants a decree of annulment or dissolution
of marriage or of separation, it has power further to decree as follows:
(a) For the future care and custody of the minor children of the
marriage by one party or jointly and for the visitation rights of the par-
ent or parents not having custody of such children as it may deem just
and proper.
53. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 211 (1981) provides: "The father and mother
are the joint natural guardians of their minor children and are jointly entitled to the
care, custody, control, services and earnings of such children. Neither parent has any
rights paramount to the rights of the other with reference to any matter affecting
such children."
54. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(a) (West Supp. 1980).
55. Id. § 4600.5(b). See generally Cook, Joint Custody, Sole Custody: A New
Statute Reflects a New Perspective, 18 CONCILIATION COURTS REv., June 1980, at 31;
Foster & Freed, Joint Custody: Legislative Reform, TRIAL, June 1980, at 22; Kandel,
California's Joint Custody Statute, THE L.A. LAW. July-August 1980, at 35.
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IV. CALIFORNIA'S JOINT CUSTODY STATUTE
Joint custody bills were introduced in both houses of the
California Legislature in 1979.11 Former Senator, now Court of
Appeal Justice, Jerome Smith authored Senate Bill 477 (S.B.
477), which authorized a court to make a joint custody award
and created a presumption of joint custody contingent upon
agreement of the parents to such an award. Senate Bill 477
passed the legislature and was signed into law by Governor
Brown in July, 1979. The introduction of Assembly Bill 1480
(A.B. 1480), authored by Assemblyman Charles Imbrecht,
closely followed passage of S.B. 477. Although there was some
basis for joint custody in previous decisional law, this legisla-
tion was California's first statutory recognition of the joint
custody arrangement.5 7
Prior to the new legislation there had been considerable
doubt about the court's authority to award joint custody. Be-
cause previously existing law made no mention of joint cus-
tody, many judges believed they had no legal authority to
grant a shared custody award. Parental requests for shared
physical and legal custody of the children were denied by
some courts based on a lack of jurisdiction, and granted by
other courts on the basis of their discretionary authority.58
56. Senate Bill 477, Reg. Sess., 1 CAL. J. SENATE 700 (1979-80) (introduced by
Senator Jerome Smith) and Assembly Bill 1480, Reg. Sess., 1 CAL. J. ASSEMBLY 1937
(1979-80) (introduced by Assemblyman Charles Imbrecht). Joint hearings were not
possible because neither S.B. 477 nor A.B. 1480 was in the same forum simultane-
ously. After the passage of S.B. 477, A.B. 1480 was viewed as a corrections bill. Clari-
fications that were advisable within S.B. 477 could be accomplished through A.B.
1480. Assembly Bill 1480 was also viewed as a vehicle through which the legislature
could rectify the discrepancy between S.B. 477 and the decision in In re Marriage of
Neal, 92 Cal. App. 3d 834, 155 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1979). See note 108 and accompanying
text infra. Assembly Bill 1480 supplemented S.B. 477 in significant areas, and the
composite bill which evolved is the most exhaustive joint custody legislation in the
nation. See, California Judiciary Committee hearings, A.B. 1480 (Joint Custody),
Tuesday, August 21, 1979, 1:30.
57. A joint custody bill, A.B. 3475, Reg. Sess., 7 CAL. J. ASsEMBLY 12533 (1975-
76), was introduced into the legislature in 1977, but died in the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Judiciary Committee Report, Reg. Sess., 9 CAL. J. SENATE 17454 (1975-
76).
58. Senate Committee on Judiciary Digest, concerning S.B. 477, at 1-2 (Oct.
1979). See Bill Digest, May 1979, at 2, prepared by L. Young and presented to the
Assembly Committee on Judiciary ("Currently, requests for joint custody in child
custody proceedings are not disposed of uniformly. Some courts will routinely deny
requests for joint custody; other courts will, in certain instances grant joint legal cus-
tody while giving physical custody to only one parent.").
[Vol. 21
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This ambiguity was clarified by the legislature in its passage
of the joint custody legislation.
A. Statutory Joint Custody
With the new statute, Civil Code section 4600, legislative
notice is clearly given to attorneys, judges, and parents that it
is the express public policy of California that minor children
should have continuing access to both parents after the par-
ents have separated or dissolved their marriage. The statute
does not mandate joint custody agreements, but its policy
statement makes it unmistakably clear that children should
continue their relationship with both parents after divorce.
Section 4600 of the Civil Code has been modified to express a
policy favoring enhanced visitation privileges and joint cus-
tody arrangements:
The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public
policy of this state to assure minor children of frequent
and continuing contact with both parents after the par-
ents have separated or dissolved their marriage, and to
encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities
of child rearing in order to effect such policy.5
The language of section 4600 expresses the legislature's desire
that the parent-child relationship is to be maintained after
dissolution. Frequent contact avoids a break in that relation-
ship and continues an alliance that is beneficial to the par-
ents, the children and society.
In harmony with the legislative policy thus expressed, the
new legislation requires the court to consider a custody award
to both parents jointly or to either parent. The joint custody
award alternative precedes mention of the alternative of an
award to either parent and by this change in language, indi-
cates that the California legislature now favors shared custody
arrangements." The joint custody alternative may reduce fric-
59. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1980). Originally, A.B. 1480 included the
phrase "equal access to both parents" within its public policy statement. A.B. 1480
(March 29, 1979). This would have been a limiting requirement in the flexibility of
joint custody arrangements, implying equally divided time. Assembly Bill 1480, was
amended by the Senate on Aug. 29, 1979 to delete this phrase. A.B. 1480, Reg. Sess.,
4 CAL. J. SENATE 6875, 6915 (1979-80).
60. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1980) provides: "Custody should be
awarded in the following order of preference, according to the best interests of the
child: (a) To both parents jointly pursuant to Section 4600.5 or to either parent."
1981]
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tion between parents in a child custody proceeding. If parents
know that joint custody is an option of the court, perhaps
they will be less inclined to litigate their access to the child.
The motivation for the provision is clear; recent legislative ef-
forts have endeavored to promote equality between the sexes
and the new alternative for shared custody furthers this goal.
The bill also specifies that "in making an award of cus-
tody to either parent, the court shall consider. . . which par-
ent is more likely to allow the child or children frequent and
continuing contact with the noncustodial parent. .... ,,1 This
section provides significant criteria for evaluating the suitabil-
ity of a sole custodian. It benefits the more cooperative parent
in sole custody decisions by making that parent more likely to
be awarded custody. The tolerance requirement prevents a
parent from disagreeing to joint custody merely for the pur-
pose of being granted sole custody. Thus if either parent
proves to be totally uncooperative, it will only ensure sole cus-
tody to the more forebearing parent.
Although the last vestiges of sex-biased language were re-
moved from the child custody statutes in 1972, the new legis-
lation explicitly mandates gender neutrality. "In making an
award of custody to either parent, the court. . . shall not pre-
fer a parent as custodian because of the parent's sex."' "6 Al-
though this provision is clearly surplusage, those judges who
have invariably awarded custody to the mother may be influ-
enced by this explicit declaration that child custody awards
are not to be made on the basis of the sex of the parent.
The bill also authorizes the court, in its discretion, to re-
quire the submission of an implementation plan for the cus-
tody order. 58 This provision allows the court to require a plan
for either sole or shared custody prior to its award. Previously,
Before amendments, A.B. 1480 was a much stronger bill than that ultimately ap-
proved. The proposed legislation stated that custody should be awarded in the follow-
ing order of preference: "(a) To both parents in joint physical and legal custody. (b)
To either parent if a preponderance of the evidence established that it is in the best
interests of the child that custody should be awarded to one parent or if the parents
agree that one parent shall assume custody." Assembly Bill 1480 (March 29, 1979)
was amended by the Assembly on May 14, 1979 to delete subdivision (a). A.B. 1480,
Reg. Sess., 3 CAL. J. ASSEMBLY 4731, 4792 (1979-80). It was subsequently amended by
the Senate on Aug. 29, 1980 to delete subdivision (b). A.B. 1480, Reg. Seas., 4 CAL. J.
SENATE 6875, 6915 (1979-80).
61. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b)(1) (West Supp. 1980).
62. Id.
63. Id.
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the court allowed testimony about the merits of the parent to
be awarded sole custody, but the sole custodian was not re-
quired to submit an implementation plan. If a parent is now
required to submit a plan to the court, it may inspire the pro-
posed sole custodian to allow more liberal visitation rights.
The visitation plan requirement also permits the judge to
evaluate how cooperative a parent will be. It is quite possible
that a sole custodian may submit such a generous visitation
plan that the court may then alter its award to joint custody.
The court may, in its discretion, require a plan subse-
quent to the custody award." Therefore, the court may award
joint custody without an implementation plan. The delayed
plan has the benefit of preventing a reluctant joint custodial
parent from initially sabotaging the arrangement by refusing
to agree on a particular detail. In addition, the conflict inher-
ent in a dissolution proceeding may be ameliorated by defer-
ring the shared custody plan to a later date. However, if par-
ents are not in agreement on essential matters, such as
schools, friends, routine, and lines of authority, joint custody
would be unsettling to children already disoriented by the di-
vorce of their parents.
It is not made clear within this provision whether the
court has jurisdiction to award joint custody without a future
requirement for an implementation plan. If such an award is
made, it may lead to an increase in modification proceedings
as parents encounter areas of conflict that have not been
resolved.
B. Presumptive Joint Custody
Section 4600.5(a) of the Civil Code now provides for a
presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of the
child when both parents seek joint custody. 5 As a practical
matter, when parents agree on joint custody, strong evidence
should be required to justify setting aside the proposal. If
couples have separated amicably and have been able to devise
64. Id.
65. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600.5(a) (West Supp. 1980) provides in part:
There shall be a presumption, affecting the burden of proof, that joint
custody is in the best interests of a minor child where the parents have
agreed to an award of joint custody or so agree in open court at a hear-
ing for the purpose of determining the custody of the minor child or
children of the marriage.
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an implementation plan for shared custody, they are prime
candidates for a joint custody decree. It is interesting to note
that it is not necessary that the parents agree to joint custody
prior to their appearance in court." This may further en-
courage joint custody agreements.
If the court denies a request for joint custody, the court
must render a written explanation.6 7 This may lead to an in-
crease in the incidence of joint custody decrees because even a
judge wary of the new joint custody statute will be hesitant to
deny the award to two fit parents. If such an award is re-
quested and denied, it gives the parents a legal basis for
appeal.
Significantly, the statute authorizes the court, in its dis-
cretion, to award joint custody even where one parent seeks
such an arrangement but the other parent does not agree.
"Upon the application of either parent, joint custody may be
awarded in the discretion of the court in other cases."' " Thus,
an uncooperative parent has no veto power over a joint cus-
tody award. This provision is also the greatest source of un-
certainty in the legislation. There are serious legal and practi-
cal objections to a joint custody order imposed without the
agreement of both parents. Arguably, this is not a workable
starting point for a shared custody arrangement. Joint cus-
tody is a personal arrangement that requires a definite com-
mitment on the part of each party. The conflict that results
when one parent is uncooperative in carrying out the terms of
a joint custody decree may be contrary to the best interests of
the child. An award without agreement may lead to more fre-
quent modification hearings and the subsequent proceedings
may well be more acrimonious and adversarial than the initial
child custody litigation.
The court may initiate an investigation to determine the
suitability of a joint award. "For the purpose of assisting the
court in making a determination whether an award of joint
custody is appropriate under this subdivision, the court may
direct that an investigation be conducted pursuant to the pro-
visions of Section 4602.""9 The parent who has retained the
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. § 4600.5(b).
69. Id. Section 4602 provides in part:
In any proceeding under this part, when so directed by the court, the
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former family home or the parent with sufficient funds to es-
tablish living arrangements conducive to childrearing may
well have the advantage in such an investigation. In a modifi-
cation proceeding, the investigation may be more advanta-
geous for the former husband or wife who has remarried and
whose spouse prefers to remain at home and care for the
children.
Joint legal custody is sanctioned by statute if parents
wish such an arrangement. "[S]uch [an] order may award
joint legal custody without awarding joint physical custody."70
A decree of joint legal custody without concurrent joint physi-
cal custody giveg both parents joint authority in major deci-
sional areas. The scope of this authority encompasses such
matters as education, medical care, and religion. This provi-
sion is most troublesome, for it appears to be in conflict with
the intent of the statute as expressed throughout A.B. 1480.71
The clause may allow the court to avoid the award of joint
physical custody in appropriate circumstances, thereby cir-
cumventing the intent of the legislation that parenting be
shared.7
Joint custody orders may be modified or terminated if it
is in the child's best interest, and prior sole custody awards
may be modified at any time to permit joint custody.738 The
bill requires a statement of reasons for the modification or
termination order. 4 In some cases, joint custody will be a con-
tinuing source of dissension between parents. If substantial
disagreement does follow the decree, the most likely recourse
will be through the courts. An increase in modification hear-
ings may result.
probation officer or domestic relations investigator shall conduct a cus-
tody investigation and file a written confidential report thereon. The re-
port may be considered by the court and shall be made available only to
the parties or their attorneys ....
70. Id. § 4600.5(c).
71. See notes 37-43 supra and notes 103-07 infra for discussion of cases negat-
ing the significance of joint legal custody. The legal effect of a decree of joint legal
custody has been increasingly limited by case law.
72. A.B. 2197 § 1 (Jan. 29, 1980), proposes to change the wording of the above
quoted portion of the statute. The proposed change is as follows: "Except where the
parents have agreed to both joint legal and physical custody, the order may award
joint legal custody without awarding joing physical custody." Id Hearings on this
amendment, however, were postponed. Assembly Weekly History 535 (Aug. 31, 1980).
73. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4600, 4600.5(d) (West Supp. 1980).
74. CAL. CIV. CoDE § 4600.5(d) (West Supp. 1980).
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A noteworthy provision encourages the use of conciliation
courts to assist the parents in formulating or carrying out an
implementation plan.
In counties having a conciliation court, the court or the
parties may, at any time, pursuant to local rules of court,
consult with the conciliation court for the purpose of as-
sisting the parties to formulate a plan for implementation
of the custody order or to resolve any controversy which
has arisen in the implementation of a plan for custody.75
This provision is significant because it represents a shift from
an adversarial to a mediation process. It is beqoming more evi-
dent that child custody determination is in many respects ex-
trajudicial and should not be part of the adversary system.
When couples reach their own decisions through counseling,
they are far less likely to continue using the legal process to
harass each other.76 This provision should lighten the court's
burden in those metropolitan areas that maintain conciliation
courts; it will, however, have the opposite effect in jurisdic-
tions without such facilities. The court's time will be better
utilized if conciliation court personnel assist in mediating con-
flicting demands before their submission to the judge. Inas-
much as the success of a joint custody arrangement depends
on the negotiation process, conciliation courts will play an ac-
tive role in the encouragement of joint custody arrangements.
The statute's concluding provision mandates that the
noncustodial parent be allowed access to the "records and in-
formation pertaining to a minor child, including but not lim-
ited to medical, dental, and school records."' "7 The access to
information is not confined to the categories specifically men-
tioned in the statute. 8
The foregoing statutory framework secures joint custody
as an important alternative in child custody proceedings. The
concept of joint custody is woven throughout the fabric of the
statute. The statute begins with a public policy statement en-
couraging frequent and continuing contact with both parents,
75. Id. § 4600.5(0.
76. See Ramey, Stender & Smaller, supra note 45 at 576 ("A joint custody
agreement usually arises out of a mutually acceptable plan in which the parents nego-
tiate their own working relationships and resolve their own differences. Therefore, it
is far less likely that they will repeatedly return to court.").
77. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4600.5(g) (West Supp. 1980).
78. Id.
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proceeds to list joint custody as the preferred alternative
along with sole custody, and further establishes the concept
by a presumption of joint custody in section 4600.5. The new
law sanctions an alternative way of restructuring families and
reflects the current movement toward full sexual equality.
The statute's many provisions may, however, open up the pos-
sibility of increased child custody litigation and custody modi-
fication hearings.
IV. AREAS THE STATUTE DOES NOT ADDRESS
Although the new statute clearly sanctions the joint cus-
tody concept, it ignores some potential problem areas. The
transition into the new law would be facilitated by clarifica-
tion of several important issues. The statute's lack of a clear
definition of joint custody and its failure to provide judicial
standards places heavy demands on attorneys and judges.
Similarly, uncertainty surrounds the issue of interstate child
custody jurisdiction. The issues not addressed by the legisla-
tion may lead to confusion and variance in the application of
its provisions.
A. Vagueness of Definition
The legislation lacks a definite explanation of the joint
custody concept, defining it as "[a]n order awarding custody
of the minor child or children to both parents and providing
that physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a
way as to assure the child or children of frequent and continu-
ing contact with both parents. . . .17 This definition fails to
alleviate the inconsistency and uncertainty prevalent in cur-
rent child custody literature.80 The courts have had very lim-
79. Id. at § 4600.5(c).
80. See, e.g., Nielson, Joint Custody: An Alternative for Divorced Parents, 26
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1084, 1088 (1979) ("[J]oint custody has come to denote a division of
physical custody as well as shared legal custody."). M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra
note 9, at 173, state:
[J]oint custody is that postdivorce custodial arrangement in which par-
ents agree to equally share the authority for making all decisions that
significantly affect the lives of their children. It is also that postdivorce
arrangement in which child care is split equally or, at the most discrep-
ant, child care resolves itself into a two-to-one split.
Abarbanel, Shared Parenting After Separation and Divorce: A Study of Joint Cus-
tody, 49 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 320, 320 (1979) states that joint custody families are
ones "in which children live in two homes, in which neither parent is considered the
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ited experience in joint custody awards and need to have joint
custody distinguished from other types of custody arrange-
ments. Although the provision explicitly mentions the physi-
cal aspect of joint custody, the statute does not clarify the dif-
ference between sole custody with extensive visitation and
joint custody. The statute may be purposely vague in order
not to restrain the development of shared custody arrange-
ments. Nevertheless, ambiguity in the definition may lead to
confusion within the legal system as judges attempt to deter-
mine which type of child custody award they are granting.
Under the present definition, a mere altering of terms could
continue the previous pattern of child custody decrees made
under the former law. This was clearly not the intent of the
legislation.
To be effective, the statutory definition of joint custody
must be interpreted to permit an order in which both parents
continue to share responsibility for the care, custody and con-
trol of their children." Both parents should have equal au-
thority as to a child's upbringing, education and general wel-
fare, 2 shared legal responsibility for major decisions affecting
the child, and shared physical custody of the child for signifi-
cant periods on an alternating basis.
The courts will also need further guidance in determining
whether a joint custody award is appropriate in a particular
situation. The legislation sets forth no guidelines to aid the
court. Whether an award is agreed upon or court imposed,
there are areas of agreement that should be worked out be-
forehand.8 8 Judges should inquire into these arrangements84
and establish criteria for the evaluation of an implementation
plan. Some essential factors that courts may wish to consider
in determining whether a joint custody order is a workable
'visitor', and in which both parents actively continue to share parenting responsibili-
ties after they have separated." Woolley, Shared Custody, 1 FAM. ADVOCATE 6, 6
(1978) states:
I have defined shared custody as any method that permits the children
to grow up knowing and interacting with each parent in an every-day
situation, whether that comes by splitting the time on a fifty-fifty basis
each week or by having the children go live with the other parent for
several years or more.
81. See, e.g., Cox & Cease, Joint Custody: What Does It Mean? How Does It
Work? 1 FAM. ADVOCATE 10, 10 (1978).
82. Id. at 11.
83. See Abarbanel, supra note 80, at 325-27.
84. Nielson, supra note 80, at 1121.
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and realistic resolution for a particular family include the
following:
1. Whether the parents have demonstrated agreement
and cooperation with regard to the child."5
2. Whether the parents have demonstrated an ability to
communicate regarding the needs of the child."6
3. Whether both parents have been actively involved in
the care and upbringing of their children prior to the
divorce .87
4. Whether the parents are committed to their children
and to the joint custody arrangement.88
5. Whether both parents evidence an ability to support
each other as parents even though there may be disagree-
ment as to childrearing practices.8"
6. Whether the parents are able to detach their relation-
ship qua parents from their former marital relationship.' 0
If the above criteria are met, courts should judicially impose
joint custody and require the parents to consider the mechan-
ics of the arrangement. 1 The lack of cooperation in the sub-
mission of an implementation plan may jeopardize the joint
custody arrangement and could potentially determine which
parent is to be awarded sole custody. The court should evalu-
ate the plan on the basis of the needs of the individual
family.'2
B. Interstate Joint Custody
The jurisdictional problems involved in interstate en-
forcement of joint custody decrees are not considered in the
statute. No provision is made for joint custody under the Uni-
form Child Custody Jurisdiction Act; therefore, a joint cus-
tody order entered under the new law could be subverted in
85. See Rabbino, Joint Custody Awards: Toward the Development of Judicial
Standards, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 105, 121 (1979).
86. See Foster, supra note 11, at 31.
87. See Gaddis, supra note 6, at 18; Folberg & Graham, supra note 12, at 579.
88. See Abarbanel, supra note 80, at 326.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Rabbino, supra note 85, at 121. Subjects that must be considered in-
clude the following: education, medical care, religious training, geographic proximity,
financial responsibility, the child's routine, parental responsibility areas, lines of au-
thority, division of time, and a conflict resolution plan. It is imperative that the par-
ents agree to an extrajudicial procedure to resolve disputes.
92. Id. at 126.
1981l 489
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [
the courts of another state.93 Joint custody is considered un-
determined custody in the interstate context.9 4 If a joint cus-
tody arrangement is imposed upon an unwilling parent who
desires sole custody, there is a very real possibility that the
parent may leave the state with the child. The legislature was
wise, however, in not placing a restriction on moving from the
jurisdiction after a joint custody award. Such a restriction
might encourage a parent to leave clandestinely with the
child. In addition, a restraint on the right to move is a consti-
tutional issue yet to be resolved in the child custody context.9 5
VI. WAS THE JOINT CUSTODY STATUTE NECESSARY?
The need for joint custody legislation has been ques-
tioned; the legal structure which existed prior to the new law
permitted regular and generous visitation to the noncustodial
parent. The "best interests of the child" standard dictated the
nature of the visitation rights and within that structure par-
ents had great latitude in dividing a child's time. In effect,
many parents have been working out" 'joint custody' arrange-
ments, probably for as long as the concept of post divorce cus-
tody awards has existed . . . ."96 A typical visitation plan
might provide for alternating weekends, holidays, or a period
of time during the summer. A provision in the plan could pro-
vide for automatic increases in the length of visitation if
desired. 7
Moreover, it has been noted that California decisions
have long permitted the award of joint legal custody to both
parents and physical custody to one of them. California courts
have experimented with the sharing of legal and physical cus-
tody under the statutory mandate that the court may make
such award as "is necessary and proper." 8 The court's wide
93. See Senate Committee on Judiciary Digest, concerning A.B. 1480, at 4
(Aug. 20, 1979).
94. Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
and Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody and Excessive Modifica-
tions, 65 CALir. L. REV. 978, 1011 (1977).
95. Id. at 1008-09, 1012. See also Bodenheimer, Equal Rights, Visitation and
the Right to Move, FAM. ADVOCATE, Summer 1978, at 18.
96. Folberg & Graham, supra note 46, at 569.
97. Johnson, Visitation: When Access Becomes Excess, FAM. ADVOCATE, Sum-
mer 1978, at 14, 16-17.
98. In re Marriage of Neal, 92 Cal. App. 3d 834, 840, 155 Cal. Rptr. 157, 160
(1979). See also Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal. 2d 202, 259 P.2d 656 (1953); In re Marriage
Vol. 21
JOINT CUSTODY
discretion in the determination of custody and visitation
rights has been consistently acknowledged. ' 9
That the court had the power to award joint custody
under the old legislation is implicit in a number of California
cases. The holding in Priest v. Priest,100 sustained the entry of
a decree dividing the custody of a child under seven years of
age. Both parents had been found fit and proper persons to
have the custody of the child. The mother contended upon
appeal that she should have been awarded the custody of the
children, in accordance with section 138 of the Civil Code
which provided that "other things being equal, if the child is
of tender years, custody should be given to the mother."101
The court held that the paramount principle was the welfare
and best interests of the child and found that the trial court
had not abused its discretion in awarding custody to each par-
ent for alternating three-month periods.
In a more recent case, Klemm v. Superior Court,' the
parents agreed to an arrangement "whereby custody of the
children would be joint, that is, each [parent] would have the
children for a period of two weeks out of each month. .... , 1
There were no contested issues before the court; the parental
cooperation essential for shared custody was evident and the
trial judge awarded joint custody in accord with their
requests.""4
In re Marriage of Neal,0 5 decided in May 1979 just
before the enactment of the joint custody legislation, gave
judges clear authority to award joint custody. The court
stated that the order of preference established in Civil Code
section 4600 "does not diminish the court's jurisdiction to ex-
of Russo, 21 Cal. App. 3d 72, 98 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1971); Harris v. Harris, 186 Cal. App.
2d 788, 9 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1960); Winn v. Winn, 143 Cal. App. 2d 184, 299 P.2d 721
(1956).
99. See, e.g., Bratt, supra note 8, at 286; Annot., 92 A.L.R. 2d 695, 697 (1963)
("A court which is charged with the duty of awarding the custody of a minor child
clearly has the power to divide or alternate the custody of the child between its
parents.").
100. 90 Cal. App. 2d 185, 202 P.2d 561 (1949).
101. CAL. CIV. CODE § 138 (West 1954) (repealed 1970).
102. 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1977). This is the first published
appellate case to discuss a court order awarding joint legal and joint physical custody
of the children.
103. Id. at 896, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
104. Id.
105. 92 Cal. App. 3d 834, 155 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1979).
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ercise the essential discretionary authority with which [that
statute] invests it."106 Because a court may make any orders
for child custody "as may seem necessary and proper, ' 10 7 the
trial court did not exceed its jurisdictional bounds in making
an order awarding joint custody.
The Neal case is also significant in its departure from
past decisions that interpreted joint custody. Earlier decisions
had awarded physical custody to one parent and joint legal
custody to both parents. Ostensibly, this meant that the non-
custodial parent, usually the father, would participate in the
major decisional areas, such as non-emergency medical care,
schooling and religious training. The Neal case concluded,
however, that exclusive physical custody to one parent was
tantamount to sole custody for that parent. The court found
joint legal custody to be an "ephemeral and essentially mean-
ingless" term,108 because the custodial parent in effect had
complete control of all aspects of the child's life. This appears
to be at odds with the new statute, which defines joint cus-
tody as an order which "may award joint legal custody with-
out awarding joint physical custody."1 9
The decision in Neal supplied the specific judicial sanc-
tion for joint custody needed by the courts; however, S.B. 477
and A.B. 1480 were already proceeding through the legisla-
ture. The new joint custody legislation adds weight to the
Neal decision as well as other California decisions that have
permitted some form of shared custody. The combined au-
thority of judicial interpretation and an actual statute now
enhance the jurisdiction of the court.
106. Id. at 839, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 160. It is interesting to note that the new
legislation tends to limit judicial discretion. It places restraints on the judiciary by
requiring a consideration of joint custody if one parent requests such an award and
by mandating a presumption of joint custody if both parents agree to joint custody.
Moreover, the statute requires a judge to render a decision justifying the denial of an
award of joint custody.
107. Id. The court further stated that since the record showed no agreement by
the parents and no indication that such an agreement might be reached, joint custody
was not in the best interests of the children.
108. Id. at 844, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 163. Assembly Bill 1480 was chaptered on
September 21, 1979, and supersedes Neal as to the viability and significance of joint
legal custody. See note 56 supra.
109. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600.5(c) (West Supp. 1980).
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VII. EVALUATION OF JOINT CUSTODY
Joint custody is a viable alternative for the courts to con-
sider. As additional data on the effects of shared custody be-
come available, the advantages and disadvantages of the ar-
rangement will become more apparent.110 Along with a
recognition of the benefits of joint custody, there should be an
awareness of the substantial problems that may be
encountered.
A. Disadvantages of Joint Custody
Most critics of joint custody question its practicability.
By definition, a shared custody arrangement requires two peo-
ple who can work together,' and the failure of the marriage
is perceived as evidence of a couple's inability to cooperate. In
this regard, some of the opposition to the joint custody statute
has focused on the difficulty of formulating an implemen-
tation plan. Potential future problem areas include the recon-
ciliation of differing childrearing philosophies, scheduling
problems, division of time, financial arrangements, choice of
schools and the parameters of each parent's authority.
The logistics of a joint custody arrangement also present
difficulties. There is a general aversion to children being shut-
tled back and forth between parents." 2 Children may be
placed under a great deal of stress by the lack of continuity
and stability inherent in having two homes." 8 Geographical
proximity is another important criterion for joint custody;""
110. Commissioner John R. Alexander of the West District of the Los Angeles
Superior Court has summarized the rates of controversy in joint and sole parent cus-
tody cases from the fall of 1978 through September 30, 1980. Statistics were compiled
from case files and index cards in the Santa Monica family law court. During that
period, 414 custody cases were heard. Sole custody awards were granted in 277 cases
(67%) while joint custody awards were granted in 137 cases (33%). Only 16% of the
joint custody awards resulted in repeat courtroom appearances (22 of the 137 cases),
whereas, 31% of the sole custody awards resulted in further courtroom appearances
(86 of the 277 cases). Commissioner Alexander also compiled statistics on joint cus-
tody orders where one parent did not agree to the arrangement. Seventeen joint cus-
tody decrees were awarded over parental objection during this period. Of those cases
12 (71%) were not followed by relitigation despite the initial opposition of one par-
ent. J. Cook, Evaluating the 'Success' of Joint Custody Decrees (Nov. 14, 1980) (leaf-
let on file at offices of Santa Clara Law Review).
111. Nielson, supra note 80, at 1007.
112. Roman, The Disposable Parent, 15 CONCILIATION COURTS REv. 1, 9 (1977).
113. Freed, supra note 14, at 340.
114. See Bodenheimer, supra note 94, at 1011.
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however, this requirement can be very restrictive on parents
and may constitute an interference with their right to
travel." 5
Some authorities view joint custody arrangements as a
continuing power struggle between parents with the child
caught in the middle." 6 Joint custody "provides an equal op-
portunity for the parents to compete for the child's loyalty, or
to use him as an instrument of revenge upon the other
spouse. 1" 7 It forces interaction between parents who may re-
main antagonistic toward each other. As one commentator has
stated, "[i]f the focus is on the child's welfare, rather than on
a battle of the sexes, an award of joint custody will rarely
seem justified." 1 8
Joint custody presumptions may provide too simple a
mechanism for determining custody. The option of presump-
tive joint custody may encourage the court to automatically
grant joint custody decrees without determining whether the
parents are prepared to make the arrangement work." 9 It may
be hazardous for the court to resolve delicate and important
issues with the expedient of unfounded presumptions. 2 0
Some opposition to joint custody is based on a fear that
the granting of such an award at the present time may be pre-
cipitous. Women have not yet achieved equality in the mar-
ketplace, and their inferior earning capacity may place them
at a disadvantage in custody disputes.' 2' Fathers may
threaten joint custody strictly for better bargaining power.
Joint custody plans reached through negotiation may be one-
sided because mothers may accept less in order to avoid the
115. Id. at 1008-09.
116. See Freed, supra note 14, at 341.
117. Note, The California Custody Decree, supra note 17, at 112. See, e.g.,
Plant, The Psychiatrist Views Children of Divorced Parents, 10 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 807, 812 (1944) ("It remained to modern Solomons to be the ones to really cut
the child in two.").
118. Freed, supra note 14, at 341.
119. Nielson, supra note 80, at 1121.
120. Note, Maternal Preference and the Double Burden: Best Interests of
Whom? 38 LA. L. REV. 1096, 1107 (1978). See also Freed, supra note 14, at 331,
stating:
The law's use of fictions and substantive rules of law disguised as pre-
sumptions is probably as old as our art and craft. These fictions and
rules have been useful devices to avoid difficult fact-finding and provide
a means of adapting the law to a myriad of unforeseeable circumstances
so the law may appear to be what it is not: secure and certain.
121. Ramey, Stender & Smaller, supra note 45, at 577.
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gamble inherent in litigation.122
Concern has also been expressed that courts, attorneys,
and parents may agree to a joint custody arrangement to ex-
pedite the dissolution process. The requirement that judges
render a written explanation of their decision to deny joint
custody may encourage overworked judges to grant requests.
The outcome of a custody award is not easily predictable;
however, the difficulty should not be avoided by automatically
granting joint custody requests. The court has an obligation to
develop all relevant facts before making its custody
determination. 12 3
Critics emphasize the fact that sole custody with liberal
visitation is a more efficient means of achieving, in effect, joint
custody. Court awards of "reasonable visitation" to parents al-
low them to work out their arrangement as to the logistics,
including time, place, duration, and frequency of visitation.
Some of the agitation for joint custody may involve "status-
seeking as legal custodian . . . or 'one-upmanship,' since
meaningful association with both parents is common under
the traditional sole custody, subject to visitation formula. ' 12
B. Advantages of Joint Custody
Notwithstanding the weaknesses of the statute, the ad-
vantages of joint custody are compelling. Shared custody
agreements allow both parents a greater opportunity to con-
tinue providing emotional support and guidance to their chil-
dren. The legislature and the courts are beginning to recog-
nize that when both parents are permitted to maintain their
relationship with the child, there is less emotional trauma for
all family members.12 5 The psychological boost to all involved
adds to the incentive to work together for mutual solutions to
problems. Unlike sole custody, a joint custody arrangement
meets the psychological needs of both the child and the
parents. 126
A joint custody decree underlines the fact that one parent
122. Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 960 (1979).
123. See Note, The California Custody Decree, supra note 17, at 116.
124. Foster, supra note 11, at 31.
125. Rabbino, supra note 85, at 117.
126. Nielson, supra note 84, at 1113.
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is not more powerful than the other.1 2 7 It provides judicial
recognition that both parents have an equally important role
to play in their child's life. The removal of a custodial prefer-
ence for either sex and the alternative of joint custody make it
unnecessary to depend on sexual stereotypes,128 and more ac-
curately reflects the trend in our society toward shared re-
sponsibility for the rearing of children.
Joint custody arrangements diminish the role of fault and
unwarranted competition in custody hearings. The belief that
only one parent should be awarded custody has encouraged
competition between parents for the exclusive custody of their
children. 12 9 Adversary litigation is not the ideal method to set-
tle custody problems, and lessening the court's involvement in
custody proceedings is a laudable objective.
Shared custody is an important alternative for the court
to use in its determination of the best interests of the child.
The legislative sanction and encouragement of joint custody
provide the needed nudge for reluctant judges to make such
an award.180 Although some judges have yet to overcome their
resistance to the shared custody concept, the best interests of
the child may dictate a flexible joint custody arrangement.
Past custody decisions have required judges to act in an
extrajudicial capacity and have necessitated the application of
psychological principles rather than the application of law.''
This problem is alleviated by the new legislation because it
enhances the parents' incentive to resolve their disputes out
of the courtroom.32 Everyone involved benefits by the avoid-
ance of a "bruising custody battle with its attendant bitter-
ness and emotional damages."' 33 Joint custody encourages the
parents to cooperate and, if necessary, to negotiate their areas
of conflict. 34 The importance of private decision making in
joint custody'3 3 is emphasized in the new legislation by its
127. Folberg & Graham, supra note 46, at 551.
128. Nielson, supra note 80, at 1012.
129. See, e.g., Grote & Weinstein, supra note 1, at 51; Folberg & Graham, supra
note 46, at 549.
130. Bratt, supra note 8, at 281.
131. Id. at 296.
132. See notes 75-76 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the role
of the conciliation court under the new law.
133. Bratt, supra note 8, at 273.
134. Gaddis, supra note 6, at 17.
135. Id. at 20.
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specific encouragement of the use of conciliation courts.18
VIII. CONCLUSION
Joint custody is another step toward equity in child cus-
tody awards. It is responsive to current parental roles and
lifestyles and removes sexual stereotyping from the child cus-
tody statutes. As evidenced by the new legislation and the
Neal decision, joint custody is an important alternative which
should be considered in any custody determination. It is cer-
tain that the legislation will have an impact on child custody
awards and that joint custody will be more common than in
the past. The introduction of presumptive joint custody legis-
lation is certain to follow.
Courts should be cautious in awarding joint custody, how-
ever, until more long term custody studies are conducted. Be-
havioral experts differ in their assessment of which custody
arrangement is best for children. Therefore, there is currently
little basis for presumptions in custody awards. Judges should
continue to make a case by case determination in a custody
proceeding. The child's best interest should remain the objec-
tive of every child custody award.
Sandra Blair Kloster
136. See notes 75-76 and accompanying text supra. See also Kay, A Family
Court: The California Proposal, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 1205 (1968) advocating a nonadver-
sarial family court system.
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